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November 27, 2025
Daniel Lee

Discretionary Commission in GAP Insurance – Evidence submitted to the FCA

While the motor finance mis-selling scandal rumbles on, we’ve been digging into another product that is usually sold in the same showroom, at the same desk, often in the same rushed conversation: GAP (or RTI) insurance.

And what we’ve uncovered in black and white is deeply familiar.

We’ve obtained written evidence from a GAP product administrator that dealerships have been allowed to set their own commission on GAP products, in exactly the sort of structure that drove the discretionary commission scandal in motor finance.

We’ve now shared this evidence with the FCA and will be pushing hard for a full, forensic investigation into the GAP insurance market – one that goes well beyond the box-ticking exercise the regulator carried out in 2024.


What our evidence shows

In a recent complaint response from a major GAP product administrator, the firm openly explains how pricing worked on a historic GAP sale:

  • The manufacturer (underwriter) sets a net price for the policy.
  • The administrator adds it’s remuneration, and then applies a 50% commission cap for the retailer (the dealership) to add.
  • Crucially, the administrator told the retailer that it was responsible for deciding the actual commission to add to the product, so long as it stayed within that cap.
  • In the case we reviewed, the retailer went beyond the very generous cap and added 78% commission.

In plain English: That is a discretionary commission structure in all but name.

In other correspondence, a dealership insists that it “made a profit” on the sale of the GAP product rather than “earning commission”. Whether you call it commission, profit, or margin, the economic reality is the same: the dealer’s financial reward goes up as the customer’s price goes up.


How this mirrors the motor finance scandal

If you’ve followed the motor finance scandal, this will ring alarm bells.

In motor finance, discretionary commission arrangements (DCAs) allowed dealers to:

  • Set or influence the interest rate; and
  • Take a higher commission when the customer paid a higher rate.

The Supreme Court ruled that these arrangements were unlawful, and create an unfair relationship, and the FCA is now (slowly) working on what could become Britain’s biggest redress scheme since PPI.

What we’re seeing in GAP looks eerily similar:

  • Instead of tweaking interest rates, dealers tweak GAP policy costs.
  • Instead of higher rate = higher commission, it’s higher premium = higher commission.
  • The consumer is never told that the dealer has this discretion, let alone how much of their premium is really just profit for the chain of parties involved (often well over 50% of the cost to the consumer).

Combine that with the FCA’s own data, showing that historically only a tiny percentage of GAP premiums have been paid out in claims (around 6%), while large proportions of premiums have gone in commissions, and you start to see why this will be the next mis-selling scandal.


The FCA’s 2024 intervention: necessary, but not nearly enough

To be fair, the FCA has already intervened in GAP:

  • In February 2024, it announced that multiple insurers, covering a very large share of the GAP market, had agreed to pause sales due to fair value concerns.
  • The regulator highlighted exactly those shocking figures: tiny claim payouts, huge commissions.
  • By May 2024, some firms were allowed to restart sales after reducing commission levels and making other changes. This serves as evidence that commission levels prior to February 2024 were unfair and affected fair value.

On paper, that all sounds decisive. In practice, from where we’re sitting, it looks worryingly like the usual box-ticking exercise:

  • The FCA focused on headline value measures and average commission levels, apparently failing to identify the commission arrangements.
  • It chose not to impose any fines, nor admit there were systemic failings as a result of undisclosed commission, nor take steps toward a redress scheme.
  • Our documents show precisely how large commissions and discretion was built into real-world GAP schemes, including clear wording that the retailer decides the commission within a cap.

For a regulator that has been warning about add-on insurance and poor value for more than a decade, that simply isn’t good enough.

When structures like this exist under the FCA’s nose, in a market the regulator has already labelled a problem child, you are entitled to ask whether the watchdog has been asleep at the wheel again.


What we’ve done: sharing our evidence with the FCA

We don’t think the FCA has taken GAP insurance mis-selling seriously, mirroring it’s approach to motor finance mis-selling which was brought to it’s attention way ack in 2016.

So we have:

  • Compiled the documentary evidence we’ve obtained in GAP complaint files – including:

    • direct admission confirming that dealers were free to set their own commission within a cap;
    • how this played out in real transactions, with sizeable gaps between net price and the amount charged to the customer.
  • Submitted this material to the FCA, making it clear that in our view these structures mirror the discretionary commission model now infamous in motor finance.
  • Called for a further, deeper investigation into the GAP insurance market, with a focus on:

    • administrator, distributor, seller, dealership and lender incentives (the full chain);
    • pricing discretion;
    • disclosure (or lack of it) around commissions and margins;
    • the scale of the issue, and the number of consumers have been treated fairly.

We will keep engaging with the regulator and pressing for a review that looks beyond averages and PowerPoint charts and gets to the heart of how these products were designed, priced and sold.

Our expectation and our demand is for something far more thorough than what we saw in 2024.


What this means for consumers

GAP insurance mis-selling will be the next scandal on the horizon for the same reasons as PPI and motor finance, commission and profit.

Right now, customers will have no way of answering those questions without digging into old paperwork and fighting for disclosures.

That’s where we step in, and exactly why we think the FCA needs to stand up, just as it has (belatedly) done in motor finance – to:

  • investigate historic GAP commission structures;
  • assess to what extent consumers were mis-sold;
  • and, if necessary, develop a redress framework so people can be compensated fairly.

Our message to the regulator

To the FCA, our message is simple:

  • You have already correctly recognised that GAP insurance hasn’t been giving customers fair value as a result of commission.
  • Our evidence suggests that, under the surface, incentive structures very similar to motor finance DCAs have been operating in this market.
  • That demands more than tweaks to value assessments. It demands a proper investigation into historic sales and commission structures, and a clear plan for putting things right.

discretionary commission in GAP insurance

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November 14, 2025
Daniel Lee

Why we keep re-educating FOS on GAP — and why that has to change

Opinion — We are the leading firm raising GAP concerns and complaints in the UK.

Week after week, we’re forced to re-educate Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) investigators about the basics:
fair value, commission and distribution chain remuneration. Too often, FOS decisions have attempted to skate past the money flows that turn a potentially valuable product into a PPI style profit driver to sellers, at the cost of consumers. Undisclosed commission again, sounds familiar doesn’t it?

The core problem we keep seeing

  • Commission and remuneration aren’t examined end-to-end. Most GAP sales involve two or more of: manufacturer/“producer”, underwriter, administrator, distributor, seller (dealership generally), and lender. Yet FOS casework investigators, and even Ombudsmen, regularly omits a full commission/remuneration breakdown across that chain. When the chain isn’t mapped, fair value cannot be tested.
  • Fair-value evidence (PROD 4.2) isn’t even requested. Sellers/manufacturers must be able to evidence that total price (including commissions/fees) represents fair value to the consumer. If the fair-value assessment isn’t on the file, the investigation is missing a salient document.
  • Result: We’re lodging additional service complaints and having to re-educate FOS — not because we want to, but because key evidence isn’t being gathered and obvious issues aren’t being engaged.

The regulator has already told us what the problem is

In 2024, the FCA asked the overwhelming majority of the GAP market to pause sales as a result of fair-value concerns. Public information highlighted very low claims ratios and significant commission take-out in almost all distribution chains. Later in 2024, firms were allowed to resume only after demonstrating fair value, with materially lower commissions going forward.

That is the smoking gun: if sales can restart only with substantially reduced commission, fair value clearly wasn’t there before.

What FOS needs to do better, and as a minimum

  1. Always obtain the fair-value assessment (FVA) relevant to the sale and read it alongside actual commission flows (base + variable + profit-share/volume + any premium-finance payments).
  2. Map the distribution chain (who got paid, how much, for doing what). Without this, neither “price” nor “value” is intelligible.
  3. Check term alignment Was the policy term co-extensive with the finance term (especially PCP with a balloon)?. Again, term mismatches clearly affects fair value.
  4. Apply the public context: the FCA’s pause and “materially lower commission” resumption aren’t trivia; they are central indicators about value drivers in GAP and must be the starting point to any investigation.

Why this matters for consumers

If investigators don’t demand the Fair Value Assessment and a full commission breakdown, a £400 “premium” might be assessed as “reasonable” when a large, undisclosed slice was never the price of insurance at all. That’s not a fair-value investigation; it’s a box-tick in favour of the finance and insurance industry to the detriment of consumers (yet again).

We’ll keep pushing — and helping FOS

We will continue to raise service complaints and challenging FOS where casework overlooks commission and fair-value evidence, and we’ll keep submitting clear, structured bundles so the right questions are asked. Education within FOS is clearly needed, which we are providing.

If your GAP complaint was rejected without any discussion of the fair-value assessment or a full commission breakdown, get in touch. We can review the file and, where appropriate, challenge the investigation quality.

GAP insurance fair value FOS

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November 5, 2025
Daniel Lee

The tide is turning on motor finance — and the industry’s spin is finally unravelling

Response to the APPG on Fair Banking’s report: “Car Finance Scandal: Assessing Redress (Nov 2025)”

For years, lenders and their misinformed lapdog cheerleaders insisted there was “no harm here”, warned of economic Armageddon if consumers were compensated, and lobbied for a redress model they could control. The All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Fair Banking’s report cuts through that noise and is damning on the industry and the regulator. It sets out, in black and white, the scale of the wrongdoing, the weaknesses in the FCA’s proposed scheme, and the familiar playbook of delay-and-dilute that echoes past scandals — including PPI — with GAP insurance mis-selling now looming in parallel.

Scale: this was not a niche compliance hiccup

On the FCA’s own numbers, the affected population runs to tens of millions of motor finance agreements since April 2007, with a very substantial proportion likely to be assessed as unfair, even under the regulator’s tests. That is systemic by any measure.

The redress model: conflicted, complex, and too cheap

The APPG is clear: the FCA’s proposed scheme, as drafted, is not fit for purpose. It falls short on fairness, transparency, independence and timeliness. It lets lenders act as judge and jury, deploy subjective rebuttals, and keep the key documents — forcing consumers to climb steep evidential hills that the wrongdoers themselves control. That is not an independent system; it is a self-policed rerun of what went wrong with earlier mis-selling schemes.

On quantum, the FCA’s “blended” methodology (repaying some commission plus a modelled loss) drags awards well below court, and even FOS benchmarks, before the scheme’s ridiculously low compensatory interest is even applied. In the FCA’s own worked examples, outcomes that would score materially higher under court/FOS comparators are cut down under the scheme’s model.

The proposed compensatory interest is set at a blended rate far below the long-standing 8% simple benchmark used by courts and the Ombudsman. That choice alone removes billions from consumers. Calling that “proportionate” simply privileges sector balance sheets over restitution.

The result is perverse: on the APPG’s figures, lenders could pay out £8.2bn against the excess profits of £15.6bn from the mis-selling — emerging £7.4bn in pocket even after redress. That is a green light to mis-sell again, and this is what will happen.

The truth about “no harm”

The claim that consumers weren’t harmed — or that you must look at the “whole package” (car mats and paint protection included) — withers under the report’s facts. Consumers were misled, loans were overpriced, and vulnerability correlated with harsher outcomes. The law does let decision-makers take a broad view, but the evidence of detriment is now overwhelming.

Industry doom-mongering hasn’t stood up

When senior executives warned that compensating victims would make the UK “uninvestable,” they produced no cogent economic analysis whatsoever. Markets barely flinched even as provisions rose. The rhetoric doesn’t match reality.

How we got here: a decade of slow walking

The FCA concluded years ago there was a real problem and eventually banned discretionary commission arrangements (DCAs) in 2021 — but only after years and years of consumer harm, and five long years after it was brought to its attention by a whistleblower. The dither and delay pushed many victims towards a limitation cliff-edge, repeating mistakes seen in earlier redress episodes.

Meanwhile, the heart of the wrongdoing — non-disclosure — is not in dispute. In large samples of DCA files, disclosure to consumers never happened. That is the culture the courts and Parliament have now had to address.

Why this matters — and why GAP insurance is next

The APPG situates motor finance alongside PPI: different products, same pattern — opaque commissions, conflicted distribution, and mass detriment. Many of the same firms are involved; the playbook is familiar.

That’s precisely why GAP insurance — routinely sold alongside finance and often embedded or lender-financed — demands scrutiny. The same sales environment that tolerated discretionary rate-setting, undisclosed commissions and “dealer-first” incentives in finance also nurtures mis-selling risks for add-ons like GAP. Once you accept that a vast share of finance agreements failed basic fairness tests — with non-disclosure as a central vice — it becomes untenable to pretend GAP was insulated from the culture that produced those outcomes.

What a credible fix must include

  • Independence: remove lender control over eligibility and rebuttals. Use an arms-length body or tribunal model.
  • Transparency: publish key supervisory findings and explain how industry lobbying shaped the methodology.
  • Full restitution: align quantum with court/FOS comparators and restore a meaningful compensatory interest rate, not a token blend.
  • Deterrence: issue headline grabbing substantial fines to lenders involved to deter future mis-selling.
  • Access to representation: stop nudging consumers away from legal/CMC support while firms marshal in-house teams and hold the documents.

Bottom line

The industry narrative is collapsing. The APPG has documented a scandal of historic scale, identified why the current scheme under-compensates and fails the independence test, and shown how familiar tactics — “no harm,” economic alarmism, and procedural friction — are being redeployed. With GAP insurance sales intertwined with this ecosystem, the next scandal is not speculative; it’s predictable and it is happening. The only way to restore confidence is an independent, transparent, consumer-first redress model that pays what was taken — with interest that actually compensates.

Note: This article draws on findings from the APPG on Fair Banking’s “Car Finance Scandal: Assessing Redress (Nov 2025)”.

motor finance mis-selling redress APPG report

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