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January 30, 2026
Daniel Lee

When the dealership tried to time-bar a GAP complaint… and accidentally made it much worse

Every now and then a business response lands on your desk that’s so confidently wrong you have to check you haven’t misread it.

This week’s contender is a dealership that tried to argue that it didn’t receive any commission (only profit), and that any GAP insurance complaint was out of time, and that the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) therefore couldn’t look at it.

What made it genuinely baffling is that we had already pointed out, in plain English, why the dealership’s position didn’t stack up as the consumer had never been given the salient facts. Namely, the remuneration it was paid for selling the GAP product.

If you don’t disclose the thing that turns a “normal sale” into a breach of fair value it’s very difficult to credibly argue the customer should’ve clocked the problem years ago. The stopwatch doesn’t start if you refuse to tell anyone what time it is.


The 6-year / 3-year rule, you can’t “know” what you weren’t told

FOS time limits are broadly built around this idea:

  • you usually complain within 6 years of the event; or
  • if not, within 3 years of when you became aware (or should reasonably have become aware) you had cause to complain.

That “became aware” part matters. Because awareness isn’t magic. It depends on what the consumer was actually told and what was kept conveniently off the paperwork.

When commission and fair value is at the heart of the complaint, the commission figure isn’t a trivial footnote. It’s the salient fact. And if it isn’t disclosed, it’s impossible to argue the “3-year clock” has even started ticking.

So when a dealership responds with “out of time” while simultaneously having failed to provide the key facts needed for the consumer to understand what went on, it’s not a defence. It’s an admission that the defence depends on the consumer staying in the dark.


Surprise, amplified as we evidence a DCA sitting inside the GAP sale

Our surprise didn’t stop at the time-bar attempt, it grew legs and ran a marathon.

We have evidenced the existence of commission received by the dealership (contrary to the dealerships assertions), and that there was a discretionary commission arrangement (DCA) within the GAP sale.

Yes, you heard that right, DCA within GAP sales.

We evidenced the dealership was able to set its own commission within a cap set by the GAP administrator.

That alone should be enough for any sensible firm to pause and think “Is this going to look like fair value? Is this going to look like a conflict? Are we comfortable defending this?”

But then the situation escalated.


The moment it went from “problematic” to “what on earth were you thinking?”

We’ve further evidenced that the dealership didn’t just operate within the cap.

It went beyond it, and way beyond it.

Let that sink in. If the administrator set a maximum commission under the dealership’s agreement and the dealership exceeded it, that isn’t merely “commercial discretion”. That’s potentially breaching its own agreement and detonating any remaining argument that the product was sold with even a passing resemblance to fair value.

At that point, trying to time-bar the complaint isn’t just bold, it’s self-sabotage.

Because the obvious question becomes:

Why would a dealership want FOS anywhere near this?

If you believe you delivered fair value, transparency, and compliant conduct, you welcome scrutiny.

If you don’t, you usually don’t try to invite the referee onto the pitch, hand them your rulebook, and then loudly explain you ignored the rulebook.

Yet that’s what this feels like.


The “fair value” elephant in the room

One of the core issues in these kinds of GAP cases is fair value.

A basic, common-sense way of looking at it is:

  • what did the underwriter / insurer component actually cost, versus
  • what did the consumer pay at the point of sale (and, in many cases, finance)?

When commission is very large (as it generally is within GAP sales chains) it impacts fair value beyond any reasonable argument. When that commission is discretionary (and especially when it’s pushed beyond an agreed cap), it almost becomes impossible.

This is a witches cauldron mix of PPI and motor finance commission.


And then there’s the FCA… still “asleep at the wheel”?

We’ve provided the FCA with our evidence within GAP. We’re still waiting for a response.

And, honestly, that lack of urgency feels depressingly familiar.

The FCA has history here. In motor finance, unfair commission arrangements were brought to its attention way bak in 2016.

Fast forward, and the FCA has since banned discretionary commission arrangements in motor finance, but consumers are still waiting for fair compensation.

So when firms and consumers raise “commission + discretion + poor value” concerns in adjacent product lines, you’d expect the regulator to be wide awake.

Instead, too often, it feels like the FCA is hitting snooze again while the same underlying behaviour simply reappears wearing a different product label.


What this means for dealerships and lenders

If you sell or finance GAP (or you advise on it), here’s the blunt takeaway:

  1. Time-bar arguments are not magic words to make a complaint disappear. If the consumer wasn’t given the salient facts don’t be shocked when FOS decides the complaint is still in time, and don’t be shocked if you find a legal case against you for the escalation fee.
  2. Discretionary commission is a one way ticket to compensation-ville.
  3. If you want to argue fair value, bring receipts. Underwriter cost vs consumer price. The bigger the gap, the bigger the problem.

High commission drives a culture of mis-selling, as has been proven time and time again.


Final thought: this isn’t “clever defending”, it’s damage amplification

Trying to brush off a complaint as “out of time” while the key facts were never provided is the regulatory equivalent of saying:

“They should’ve known we did something questionable, even though we didn’t tell them.”

FOS has (correctly) kicked that argument out and confirmed it will investigate.

And given the DCA evidence, the commission cap, and the apparent decision to push beyond that cap… we’re struggling to understand why the dealership would want this complaint reviewed at all.

But since they’ve effectively asked for the spotlight — we’ll make sure it’s turned on properly.

For once, even FOS shouldn’t struggle with this one.

GAP insurance complaint time limit

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January 27, 2026
Daniel Lee

FOS Still Doesn’t Understand GAP Insurance — And Consumers Are Paying the Price

We continue to educate the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) as a result of its troubling lack of understanding of GAP insurance complaints, particularly where GAP was financed through a lender and the underlying finance agreement is (or was) subject to a discretionary commission arrangement (DCA).

These complaints do not need to be placed on hold. Yet we continue to see cases frozen, progress stalled, and consumers left in limbo. This isn’t because a fair resolution is impossible, but because FOS appears to be applying a blunt “one-size-fits-all” interpretation that simply doesn’t fit the product.

One core issue is fair value of the product, something the FCA is fully aware of. GAP insurance has frequently involved very large commission extraction throughout the distribution chain. When the consumer borrows money to pay for that insurance, they borrow to pay the commission too and then paying interest on it. This compounds the fair value issue.

In this article

Why these complaints should not be on hold

The FCA’s temporary complaint handling pause was introduced to avoid disorderly outcomes in motor finance commission cases while the regulator (slowly) considers next steps. That is a real, significant policy intervention.

But it does not follow that every complaint which happens to involve a motor finance agreement should be automatically frozen, especially where a central complaint point is about an insurance product and its lack of fair value.

FOS is meant to assess complaints on the merits of the complaints. Instead, what we see far too often is administrative convenience dressed up as regulatory caution, a reflexive decision to “hold” cases that could and should be resolved now.

This is not consumer protection. It is delay in favour of lenders (again), and it risks becoming a denial of justice by attrition.

Relevant FCA background reading:
FCA statement: pause on motor finance complaints handling to lift on 31 May 2026
FCA press release: GAP insurers agree to suspend sales following FCA concerns over fair value

Two separate issues: motor finance commission vs insurance fair value

Let’s be clear about what is being muddled.

Motor finance commission (DCA) complaints generally concern the relationship between the lender and broker/dealer, and whether undisclosed commissions (and incentives to inflate interest rates) created unfair outcomes within the credit agreement.

GAP insurance fair value complaints concern whether the consumer paid a grossly inflated ‘premium’ compared to the net risk cost, with commission extraction throughout the chain (underwriter, administrators, distributors, retailers, lenders) leaving the consumer paying far more than the product can reasonably justify.

Yes, these can intersect when GAP is financed and rolled into the credit agreement. But intersection is not identity. A complaint can involve a finance agreement that is subject to DCA considerations and still be resolvable on the insurance fair value issue alone.

By repeatedly treating “financed GAP” as automatically caught in a motor-finance pause logic, FOS is revealing something deeply concerning. It cannot separate product analysis from credit mechanics.

Let’s be clear, the proposed redress scheme makes no reference to financed ancillary products, and the final rules won’t either.

A fair resolution is straightforward

A fair outcome can be achieved without FOS needing to solve every possible issue in the motor finance ecosystem.

Even if the finance agreement is subject to a DCA, FOS can still determine whether the GAP policy offered fair value and whether the consumer suffered loss as a result of paying an inflated premium as a result of the majority of the premium being commission.

In fact, financing makes the harm clearer, not harder:

  • The consumer pays the ‘premium’ (which may include excessive commission).
  • The consumer borrows to pay that ‘premium’.
  • The consumer then pays interest on the borrowed amount, meaning they may pay interest on the commission element too.

That compounding effect matters. But it does not prevent redress. It simply means redress must be calculated properly.

The “underwriter cost vs consumer price” test

FOS keeps acting as though these cases require some impossible forensic reconstruction of every commission agreement in a chain. That is nonsense.

At the heart of fair value is a simple question:

What was the underwriter’s net cost (or net premium) compared to the total end price paid by the consumer?

That comparison speaks volumes. If the consumer price vastly exceeds the underwriter cost, the additional cost to the consumer is explained by distribution-chain margin and commission extraction. And where the premium is financed, the consumer will pay even more due to interest, thus turning an already questionable value proposition into something indefensible.

FOS does not need to become an actuarial lab to grasp this. It needs to apply common sense, basic product economics, and the regulatory principle that consumers should not be charged prices that deliver poor value relative to the benefits and risk cost.

If FOS wants a practical framework, here it is:

  1. Identify what the consumer paid for GAP (including any amount added to finance).
  2. Establish (or reasonably infer) the underwriter net cost / net premium for the policy.
  3. Assess the scale of the difference, and whether it indicates a failure of fair value.
  4. Account for the fact the consumer may have paid interest on the financed premium.
  5. Provide redress that puts the consumer in the position had they not been sold the product.

Why FOS keeps needing to be educated

This is the point that should worry everyone, including firms, consumers, and policymakers.

FOS continues to have to be educated on GAP insurance repeatedly by the very party (us) that is bringing complaints or responding to FOS. That is not a sustainable position for an organisation tasked with resolving disputes in a complex financial services environment.

When a complaints body repeatedly misunderstands a product’s basic mechanics, it points to deeper structural failings:

  • Weak leadership that fails to set clear analytical standards and guardrails.
  • Insufficient training on insurance distribution economics and fair value assessments.
  • Inadequate experience in handling multi-party distribution chains and financed add-on products.
  • Poor internal knowledge management, lessons not being learned, and errors being repeated.

And that raises the most serious question of all, if FOS cannot consistently understand GAP insurance, a relatively straightforward add-on product, what confidence should anyone have in the depth and quality of its investigations across the wider market?

What FOS should do now

If FOS is serious about competence and credibility, it needs to stop treating “financed GAP + DCA-linked agreement” as an excuse to park cases.

Here are immediate, practical steps:

  • Issue an internal technical note separating motor finance commission complaints from insurance fair value complaints, including when parallel analysis is appropriate.
  • Create a specialist GAP/ ancillary insurance fair value unit (or a central expert panel) to prevent repeated basic errors.
  • Adopt a standard evidence set for GAP fair value cases: consumer premium, underwriting net cost, distribution margin, and financing impact.
  • Stop default “hold” decisions unless the pause is directly relevant to the specific complaint issue being determined.
  • Be transparent with consumers about why a case is being held and what precise question is supposedly unanswerable today.

Until it does the pattern remains unmistakable, a complaints process that seems to require external parties to supply the expertise FOS should already have.


Conclusion

FOS is keeping the wrong GAP insurance complaints on hold and the justification does not withstand scrutiny.

Where a central part of a complaint is about fair value in GAP insurance, and especially where excessive commission is a central issue, a fair resolution can still be achieved by asking one straightforward question… “what did the underwriter charge versus what did the consumer pay (and finance)?”.

It should not take an industry education campaign to get a national complaints body to understand that.

But right now, that is what’s happening and it is a damning indictment of the leadership, training, and technical capability within the organisation.

FOS Still Doesn’t Understand GAP

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January 16, 2026
Daniel Lee

Six Months. Eighty Percent. And the Slow Erosion of Trust at the Financial Ombudsman Service.

The Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) exists for one reason, to provide an independent, fair resolution when a financial firm and its customer cannot agree. That “fair and reasonable” promise is the entire point of the institution.

So when FOS publicly sets an operational target to resolve over 80% of cases within six months, it expects us to applaud the ambition. Who wouldn’t want faster answers?

But here’s where FOS falls into an uncomfortable and repeated trap as speed targets do not exist in a vacuum. They change behaviour, rewire priorities and without ruthless safeguards, they reward closure over competence, throughput over truth, and “done” over “right”.

And if that sounds familiar, it should.


A target is never “just a target”

On paper, “80% within six months” looks like a service standard. In practice, it is something else entirely. It is a a performance management tool that quietly incentivises the wrong outcome.

Because what does a six-month clock actually reward?

  • Not the best reasoning.
  • Not the most rigorous evidence gathering.
  • Not the careful handling of complex matters.
  • Not specialist product knowledge.

It rewards moving the taking the file off the desk.

When the dominant organisational message is “hit the number,” people adapt, often through incentives. They triage toward what’s easiest to close. They narrow the scope of what they consider. They avoid reopening lines of enquiry that create delay. They treat ambiguity as inconvenience rather than as a reason to dig deeper.

This isn’t speculation. It’s basic incentive design. When a metric becomes the goal, the work bends to serve the metric, not the public. That is not just a FOS problem. It’s a systems problem. But it becomes catastrophic when the “product” is justice for ordinary people.


Quality doesn’t survive on slogans

FOS will understandably point to internal quality scoring and improvements, whose definition of “quality” counts most? Is it internal dashboard, or is it the lived experience of complainants who feel their case wasn’t properly understood?

We regularly see investigations that feel alarmingly familiar:

  • superficial and inadequate fact-finding
  • critical documents not meaningfully engaged with
  • misunderstood products and processes
  • weak reasoning dressed up as certainty
  • “template thinking” where nuance is required

Far too often, our opinion is that cases are being handled by people who appear under-prepared, ill-informed and too inexperienced for the complexity and stakes involved.

This is not a personal attack on individual employees. Many will be doing their best inside a machine that pushes speed. The problem is institutional. If you design the system to prioritise quantity over quality, it is exactly what you will achieve.


We’ve been here before: Dispatches, 2018

This is the part that should set alarm bells ringing.

In 2018, Channel 4’s Dispatches aired an undercover investigation focused on FOS. Whatever view you take of the programme, it triggered parliamentary scrutiny and a formal (if inadequate) response from FOS.

A review followed. And crucially, it focused on pressure to deal with caseloads quickly which can distort outcomes and introduce new risks to casework quality.

When FOS doubles down on timeliness targets as a headline ambition without equally loud, equally measurable guarantees on investigative depth and specialist competence, it feels like an institution walking back toward a cliff edge it has already stood on.


The numbers can look good while the service gets worse

Here is the quiet danger of a target like “80% within six months”. It can be achieved while still delivering a degraded service, because the metric doesn’t measure:

  • whether evidence was properly tested
  • whether the investigator understood the product
  • whether the reasoning is coherent and consistent
  • whether the outcome reflects what is fair and reasonable
  • whether complex cases were given the time and expertise they need

It measures time to closure.

Closure can be manufactured. A system under pressure can “resolve” complaints by narrowing what it is willing to investigate, pushing informal outcomes that don’t truly address the dispute, relying on quick assumptions instead of hard verification, or discouraging escalation because escalation costs time.

If you doubt that institutions can drift into this, look at what happens when public bodies become obsessed with throughput targets in any sector – healthcare, policing, education, benefits administration. The outcome is predictable, the metric improves, the experience deteriorates.


Complaints reducing due to imposed barriers

Perhaps FOS is pushing the target as it predicts, and is seeing, a rapid decrease in the number of complaints it is receiving. It isn’t shy in giving itself a huge pat on the back, but fails to see the reason for the decrease.

FOS imposed fees for representatives to bring complaints on behalf of consumers, claiming that this would stop meritless complaints being escalated to its service. But it failed to consider the impact on vulnerable consumers, many of which seek professional representation.

Representatives are not against costs being paid, but have argued that a fair system would be for FOS to seek costs from a losing party (the lender or the representative). As things stand, both lenders and representatives pay regardless, and FOS’ current position only serves to benefit lenders and put barriers up to justice for the most vulnerable in society, the very people it needs to protect.


A separate but revealing scandal: our FOI request and the silence

Now to transparency, because if FOS wants public confidence, it must accept public scrutiny.

We submitted a Freedom of Information (FOI) request to FOS in November asking, in part, for information about exactly the kind of operational pressures and closure incentives that can undermine casework quality. We were promised a response by 17th December 2025.

Yet we are still waiting. We have chased. We have been ignored. So we will escalate to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO).

If the information is harmless and doesn’t suggest consumer harm or service standard issues, why won’t they disclose it? FOS cannot demand trust while refusing transparency


What FOS should measure instead (if it’s serious about public confidence)

If FOS wants to be faster, fine. But it must stop treating speed as the headline virtue over getting it right.

Here are better, harder questions:

  • How often are decisions changed because the investigation missed key evidence?
  • How often do ombudsman decisions overturn investigator views, and why?
  • What proportion of complaints raise “adequacy of investigation” as a concern?
  • How is specialist competence assessed and maintained by product area and complexity?
  • How many cases are reopened due to internal process failures?
  • What is the error rate under independent audit sampling, and what is done about it?

In other words, measure quality like it matters.

Because it does.


Final thought: “fast injustice” is not a public service

FOS is not a call centre. It is not a quota factory. It is not a backlog-clearance operation.

It is supposed to be a cornerstone of consumer protection, a place people go when the power imbalance is real and the stakes are personal.

If FOS turns its culture into “close cases quickly,” it doesn’t just harm individual complainants. It poisons confidence in the entire redress system.

And that is the ultimate cost of targets worshipped in isolation, you can hit 80% in six months and still fail the public.

Financial Ombudsman Service 80% cases in six months target

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January 15, 2026
Daniel Lee

Complaints Culture Is Sales Culture: What a Dealership’s Complaint Handling Reveals About Its GAP Insurance Selling

There’s a simple way to assess how seriously a business takes customers. Don’t start with the glossy brochures, start with the complaints.

In motor retail, complaints and compliance shouldn’t be a back-office inconvenience. Complaints are the clearest window into the underlying sales culture. And when that culture is “deny, ignore, delay”, it rarely stops at complaint handling. It almost always begins much earlier, at the point of sale where add-on products like GAP insurance can be sold for profit over suitability.

This post uses a real-world pattern that we see repeatedly across the sector, illustrated through one case file involving a UK motor dealership (in this instance, Cotswold Motor Group). The facts described below are drawn from documentation eventually disclosed under UK GDPR and from the complaint record itself. The complaint has been escalated to the Financial Ombudsman Service FOS).

If you think the lessons of PPI have been heard, you may want to read on.


A complaint that was met with silence

In this case, we raised a GAP mis-selling complaint on behalf of our client.

What happened next is the part that tells you everything about culture that is replicated across the overwhelming majority of the sector, from dealerships to lenders.

Instead of engaging with the substance of the complaint, setting out a position, providing evidence, showing what advice was given and what checks were made, the dealership’s approach was, in essence:

  • no acknowledgement, and
  • no response, and
  • no evidence produced to support its position.

When a firm cannot (or will not) evidence what happened at the point of sale, the consumer is left with only one realistic route. The roulette of escalating the complaint to FOS, where the test should become painfully simple:

If you can’t evidence suitability and fair disclosure, you don’t get the benefit of the doubt.

And then came the next chapter, one that dealerships increasingly dislike and attempt to avoid.


UK GDPR disclosures: the documents the dealership didn’t volunteer

Alongside the complaint we pursued a UK GDPR data subject access request to obtain the personal data and associated records held about the sale.

The documentation disclosed (after much resistance, delay, and the inevitable pressure that follows) was revealing. Not because it contained anything exotic, but because it showed what was always likely to be true:

Commission: the dealership received over 50% of the our client’s GAP payment

The disclosed paperwork shows that the dealership received more than half of the money paid for the GAP policy as commission (or equivalent remuneration) for selling the product.

That is not a minor incentive, it is the sales driver.

It must also be pointed out that the dealership would almost definitely not be the only party in the chain to receive remuneration. It is almost always the case that there are multiple parties involved in GAP, from the underwriter to any one or more of the administrator, distributor, seller and lender. On a conservative reading, that pushes the total “take” across the chain towards a level that consumers would reasonably consider eye-watering.

If you’re wondering why this feels like PPI, it is because it is PPI in all but name.

The documents also show the underlying finance agreement was for a new vehicle.

That matters because the overwhelming majority of fully comprehensive motor insurance policies include ‘new-for-old replacement’ cover.

If a customer’s comprehensive insurance already provides replacement of a new vehicle within the first 12 months (or similar), the value of a GAP product during that period simply disappears.

The key point isn’t that “GAP is always useless on new cars”. It isn’t. The point is this:

A seller can’t assume value. They have a duty to check.

In this case file, there is no evidence whatsoever that the dealership checked whether our client’s motor policy included new-for-old cover (or equivalent), despite the obvious relevance to whether GAP added meaningful benefit in the first year.

That is a suitability failure, not a technicality.

The documentation also shows another basic but serious issue:

  • The GAP policy term was 36 months, but
  • the finance agreement term was 48 months.

So even the very basic checks confirms that our client was left with 12 months at the end of the finance agreement with no GAP cover at all.

This is not a clever legal argument. It’s a common-sense suitability problem.

If the customer’s risk exposure relates to the finance period, selling a policy that ends a year before the finance ends is the kind of mismatch that must be caught immediately, either by:

  • a proper needs assessment,
  • competent advice, or
  • basic compliance controls.

When you combine a term mismatch with a lack of evidence that suitability checks were performed, the picture becomes impossible to defend.


“FOS shouldn’t struggle with this”, and that’s the point

With a case file like this, the issues are unusually clean:

  • What commission was taken (and how much)
  • Whether the customer’s existing insurance was checked for overlap
  • Whether the GAP term matched the finance term
  • Whether evidence exists of a suitability process at all

These are exactly the sort of concrete points the FOS can evaluate without needing mind-reading, and without needing to guess what “probably happened”.

If the evidence isn’t there, the firm’s defence often collapses into a single line:

“We sold it and the customer agreed.”

That line didn’t work for PPI and it cannot work here either if FOS carries out fair and competent investigations.


This is PPI all over again… and the wave is building

PPI didn’t become a scandal because the product was inherently evil. It became a scandal because it was sold for the benefit of the seller over the consumer.

If you swap “PPI” for “GAP add-ons”, the rhyme is uncomfortably similar.

Right now, many dealerships (and lenders where GAP is financed) are attempting to treat GAP mis-selling complaints as if they’re manageable one-off irritations that can be deflected or delayed.

But the sector should be careful. Because what looks like a trickle will soon become a tsunami.

A tsunami doesn’t arrive with an announcement. It arrives because the conditions were always there and everyone pretended they weren’t.


The uncomfortable conclusion

When a dealership ignores a complaint, refuses to evidence its position, and only discloses the real story when forced under UK GDPR, it doesn’t just signal poor complaint handling.

It signals how the product was sold in the first place.

And if the documents show high commission, missing suitability checks, and a cover/finance mismatch, then the question isn’t “Why did the customer complain?”

The question is how many customers haven’t complained yet?

Because they will, we’ll make sure of it.

GAP insurance mis-selling complaint

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January 6, 2026
Daniel Lee

Re-educating FOS on GAP: “Demands & Needs” Isn’t Optional

There’s a moment in far too many of our GAP insurance cases where the conversation stops being about the consumer’s complaint and starts becoming a tutorial.

Not for the dealership. For the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS).

We find ourselves having to explain and again that a dealership selling an insurance add-on is not just “retail staff offering a product”. The dealership is acting as an insurance intermediary and it has duties that come with that. In particular, it must carry out an adequate and evidenced demands and needs assessment to confirm the policy was suitable for this customer, this vehicle, and this situation.

History proves that consumers cannot rely on fair treatment of their complaints by lenders and dealerships.

And yet, in case after case, we’re watching FOS investigations drift into a familiar pattern of suggesting that the customer “chose” the product, the paperwork exists, therefore the sale must be fine. It’s déjà vu. This is PPI, but with a different badge on the forecourt.

The “new for old” reality: when GAP becomes redundant on day one

Let’s start with the practical issue that keeps getting missed by the inadequate initial investigation by FOS.

An overwhelming majority of new vehicles insured on fully comprehensive motor insurance are covered by “new for old” replacement in the first 12 months (sometimes longer, depending on insurer and policy terms). Put simply, if there is an accepted total loss claim against the policy the insurer replaces the vehicle with a brand new like-for-like equivalent rather than paying a depreciated cash value.

If that cover is in place, the central sales pitch that “your motor insurer won’t cover the full replacement cost” is demonstrably false. In plain English, the GAP policy is unsuitable on day one, and for a significant period of the period it is designed to cover.

We see this repeatedly:

  • A customer buys a new car.
  • The dealership sells GAP at the point of sale, often alongside finance.
  • The lender and/or dealership insists on the customer having fully comprehensive cover (and often requests evidence of cover).
  • The dealership chooses not to check whether “new for old” applies, for how long, or under what conditions.
  • The customer later discovers the GAP policy would not have added meaningful value during the first year.

That’s not a technicality. That’s a clear suitability issue.

“Demands & needs” isn’t a tick box exercise

When a dealership sells insurance, the obligation isn’t “make sure the form is signed”. The obligation is to take reasonable steps to ensure the policy is consistent with the customer’s demands and needs, and to provide a statement reflecting that.

A proper demands & needs process, in the context of a new vehicle and a GAP add-on, should include questions like:

  • Do you have fully comprehensive cover arranged?
  • Does your policy include “new for old” replacement? If so, for how long?
  • What’s your likely annual mileage and usage? (Some “new for old” terms vary.)
  • Is the vehicle financed? If yes, what are the settlement terms and deposit/negative equity position?
  • Does the term of the GAP product match the term of the finance agreement?
  • What type of GAP is being sold (RTI, VRI, finance GAP, return to invoice etc.), and what gap is it meant to fill in this customer’s situation?

In most dealership files, the pre-ticked “assessment” is essentially:

  • “Customer wants peace of mind.”
  • “Customer chose GAP.”
  • “Customer signed.”

That’s not a demands & needs assessment. It’s a sales narrative.

The uncomfortable parallel with PPI

The PPI scandal wasn’t only about one product. It was about a system and culture:

  • Add-ons sold at the moment of purchase – incentivised by commission (just as GAP is)
  • Pressure, bundling, and “it’s part of the deal”
  • Weak checks on suitability
  • Generic “needs” statements that could apply to anyone
  • Paperwork used as a shield instead of evidence of compliance

GAP sold at dealerships often follows the exact same behavioural script. It’s offered at the emotional peak of the buying journey when the customer is committed, financially stretched, and primed to protect the purchase. The pitch is simple.

And when complaints arise, the defence is also familiar; “they agreed”, “they signed”, “they could have read it”.

That’s exactly why demands & needs matter. It is the guardrail that stops the add-on machine from running on autopilot.

Why we’re “re-educating” FOS (and why that should worry everyone)

Let’s first be clear, we are the pioneers in GAP mis-selling claims and FOS is learning (slowly), but it only currently has one investigator looking into GAP complaints and he hasn’t got the required experience or understanding of these sales, nor the undeniable similarities to PPI.

The FOS is supposed to be the backstop, providing informal, fair, consumer-focused, and grounded in how financial services should work in practice, not just what a form says.

But in this area, we see worrying signs that institutional knowledge has faded, and fast. The turnover of employees at FOS has clearly resulted in a loss of experience of how PPI was sold, which in turn has resulted in poor investigations and a lack of understanding.

So we end up having to explain things that should be foundational:

  • A dealership can be an insurance intermediary, with regulatory duties.
  • Demands & needs is not satisfied by a generic statement (often pre-populated) detached from the customer’s circumstances.
  • A GAP sale is unsuitable if the customer’s primary motor policy already provides “new for old” replacement for the relevant period.
  • A GAP sale is unsuitable if the term of the cover does not match the term of the finance agreement.
  • The existence of documentation isn’t proof of a compliant sales process—especially when the documentation is boilerplate.

Even more concerning is the day-to-day quality issue with investigations that fail to request the relevant evidence. If the seller says “we did a demands & needs assessment”, the next step shouldn’t be to accept that at face value. The next step is to request it and obtain evidence to support it.

  • What questions were asked?
  • What answers were recorded?
  • What training and scripts were used?
  • What evidence was requested and obtained?
  • What product literature was provided at the time?
  • What exclusions and limitations were explained?
  • Was “new for old” discussed at all?
  • Was product term discussed at all?

If none of that exists, it’s not a minor gap in the file. It’s indicative of a mis-sale.

The minimum expectation of a competent FOS approach must be: ‘if the product may be redundant for a common and foreseeable reason (like “new for old” cover on a new car), the seller should have checked’.

Not as an optional extra. As part of a basic selling responsibly.

What we’re demanding from FOS

This isn’t about being anti-FOS, as much as it may appear. It’s about protecting the credibility of the system and ensuring consistency for consumers.

A better approach would look like this:

  • Treat dealership GAP as regulated distribution, not retail upselling.
    Investigations should reflect the responsibilities that come with selling insurance.
  • Make demands & needs evidence-based.
    If the seller can’t show what was asked and recorded, don’t assume it happened – look at PPI.
  • Handle “new for old” as a standard suitability checkpoint for new vehicles.
    If the seller didn’t check whether it applied, assume ‘new for old’ existed.
  • Ensure the policy matches the requirement.
    If the GAP term and finance agreement term is a mismatch, there is a clear suitability red flag.
  • Stop using signatures as a substitute for suitability.
    A signed document proves a sale occurred. It does not prove it was appropriate.
  • Raise the bar on investigator training and internal guidance.
    These cases shouldn’t depend on whether the consumer (or their representative) happens to educate the investigator.

The basic bottom line

This shouldn’t be a niche argument. It’s the basics of selling insurance fairly.

When a consumer buys a new car, and their comprehensive insurance is highly likely to include “new for old” in the first year, selling GAP without checking that reality is not a harmless oversight.

And when the consumer complains, they should not have to become the trainer in the room.

If the FOS has lost the muscle memory from the PPI era—about add-on sales, suitability, and the misuse of paperwork as a shield then we’ll keep doing what we’re doing by rebuilding that understanding case by case.

But we shouldn’t have to.

FOS GAP insurance demands and needs

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